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Abstract 
People underestimate how much their preferences will change in the future, a phenomenon 
sometimes referred to as a “presentism bias”. Recently we found that this presentism bias is 
attenuated when thinking about the preferences of other people. The aim of the current 
study was to investigate whether predicting future preferences also differs depending on 
the level of social distance between self and other. Sixty-seven participants completed a 
perspective-taking task in which they were required to think about their own preferences, 
those of a generic peer and those of a close other both now and in the future. They were 
also asked to consider the preferences of an older adult now. Participants predicted less 
change between their current and future preferences than between the current and future 
preferences of a generic peer. Predicted change in preferences for a close other were 
similar, but not identical, to those made for the self. When considering relevant future 
preferences, participants predicted less change for themselves than for their close others, 
and less change for close others than for generic peers. In other words, as social distance 
increases, the presentism bias decreases. Interestingly, participants estimated that both 
they and their peers would not change so much that they become similar to current older 
adults. Simulating the future perspectives of a generic peer or, even better, the current 
perspectives of an older adult, may thus result in improved long-term decision-making, as it 
may enable a more realistic estimation of the magnitude of likely changes in the future. 
 
Keywords: Future thinking, Projection bias, Presentism bias, Self, Close other, Aging 
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Introduction 
Thoughts about the future occupy a prominent position in the mental life of humans 
(Atance, 2008; D'Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2011), with some studies reporting 
twice as many future-oriented as past-oriented thoughts (Jason, Schade, Furo, Reichler, & 
Brickman, 1989). Future thinking can be directed towards ordinary mundane events, such as 
what to have for lunch tomorrow, but it can also be directed towards more significant life 
choices, such as getting married or accepting a specific job, that will impact us in a more 
long-term way. Unfortunately the conclusions that we draw about the future are not always 
accurate, and people typically underestimate how much their future preferences and values 
will change over time (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003; 
Quoidbach, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2013). Several terms have been proposed to explain this 
phenomenon. Loewenstein et al. (2003) describe a “projection bias” by which we project 
our current preferences, feelings or values into the future, despite the fact these may no 
longer be relevant. Quoidbach et al. (2013) discussed an “end of history illusion” by which 
adults seem to believe that the amount they are changing has slowed down, and they have 
become the person that they will remain for the rest of their lives. Another similar 
mechanism described by the same authors is the “presentism bias”, which is the proneness 
to interpret past and future versions of one’s self in relation to one’s present motives and 
knowledge (Cameron, Wilson, & Ross, 2004; Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002). These 
terminologies all constitute different levels of explanations of the same phenomenon: 
underestimation of change of preferences and values in the future. However, for 
cohesiveness, throughout the manuscript we will use the term “presentism bias.”  
 The existence of presentism biases demonstrates that people have difficulties when 
making predictions about the future. Recently, Renoult and colleagues (Renoult, Kopp, 
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Davidson, Taler, & Atance, 2016) investigated whether these biases appear exclusively when 
people consider their own future preferences or whether they also characterize the 
predictions they make for others. We used a perspective-taking task in which young adults 
(18-33 years old) were asked how much they like stereotypically-young person things (e.g., 
top 40 music, adventure vacations) and stereotypically-old person things (e.g., jazz, playing 
bridge) now and how much they would like them in the future, when aged 70.  Participants 
also estimated these same preferences for a same-sex generic peer. Finally, they also rated 
how much an older adult, aged 70, currently liked these items.  
Participants predicted less change between their own current and future 
preferences than between the current and future preferences of a peer. This suggests that 
the presentism bias is attenuated when making predictions for others. This finding is 
reminiscent of a reduction in other cognitive biases when thinking about others, such as the 
optimism bias (Baker & Emery, 1993; Grysman, Prabhakar, Anglin, & Hudson, 2013) or the 
temporal discounting bias (Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, 2008). People thus seem more 
rational or adaptive in their thinking when reasoning about others, an effect referred to as 
the “beneficial other effect” by Lee and Atance (2016).  
One explanation for this effect is that the psychological distance imparted by 
considering someone else’s perspective allows us to think more abstractly and thus in a 
more meaning-based than experience-based manner (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007). 
This, in turn, allows us to escape the “here-and-now” and the more emotional and visceral 
aspects of decision-making (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Loewenstein, 1996; Naqvi, Shiv, & 
Bechara, 2006). Interestingly, in the Renoult et al. (2016) study, even though the presentism 
bias was indeed attenuated when making predictions for a peer, this bias was not abolished. 
Participants judged that the preferences of their peers would not change so much in the 
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future as to be similar to those of a current older adult. Thus, making predictions for a 
generic peer, even if less influenced by current desires and impulses, may still rely on 
unrepresentative or decontextualized future simulations (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007), perhaps 
reflecting inherent limits in our future thinking capacities.  
One important aspect of the design used in Renoult et al. (2016) is that participants 
considered the preferences of a generic unknown peer. The literature on social distance 
suggests that other cognitive biases, like the optimism bias (Grysman et al., 2013) and the 
temporal discounting bias (Kim, Schnall, & White, 2013; Ziegler & Tunney, 2012), are more 
similar for self and close others as compared to more socially distant others. Accordingly, we 
can hypothesize that presentism biases when evaluating one’s own and a close other’s 
future preferences are similar and, importantly, are attenuated when considering those of a 
generic peer. Such potential differences in how people think about their own, close others’, 
and more distant others’ futures are important for at least several reasons. First, our 
common misconceptions about future changes can have severe consequences, such as 
making poor health or financial choices in the present that our future selves will regret. In 
the case of taking the perspective of close-others, research shows that we often misjudge 
their preferences and make decisions that are contrary to their wishes (Tunney & Ziegler, 
2015). Consequently, identifying methods to reduce biases that people experience when 
predicting their future preferences and values may have far-reaching impact.  
Interestingly, a number of studies have shown that the content of future predictions 
can be modified. For instance, performing detailed or repeated simulations of future events 
may increase their subjective plausibility as well as the number of details produced 
(Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985; Szpunar & Schacter, 2013). Although 
there exist several methods to change the way that people think about the future, to our 
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knowledge, these methods have not targeted how perspective and social distance, more 
specifically, may impact the accuracy of people’s predictions about their future preferences. 
It is thus important to better understand whether taking other people’s perspectives (of 
different social distance or different ages) may help us to optimize the accuracy and 
adaptiveness of our decisions. 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether the presentism bias varies 
as a function of social distance. We used a similar perspective-taking paradigm as in Renoult 
et al. (2016), in which we asked young adults how much they liked stereotypically-young 
person and stereotypically-old person things now and how much they would like them in 
the future. They also had to predict how much a generic peer and a close other (friend or 
romantic partner) would like these items now and in the future. Finally, participants had to 
estimate how much a 70-year-old adult liked these items now. We hypothesized that the 
use of this paradigm would produce a graded presentism bias such that participants would 
estimate that their own preferences would change less in the future than those of a close 
other, and that the preferences of a close other would change less than those of a generic 
peer. We also predicted that self and peers’ preferences (both close other and generic 
other) would not change so much in the future as to be similar to those of a current older 
adult, reflecting a persistence of the presentism bias and a general difficulty in predicting 
change. 
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Methods 
Participants 
 Sixty-seven young adults (53 females; mean age = 20.11 years, range = 18-27) 
participated in the perspective-taking task. They were recruited through the School of 
Psychology research participation system at the University of East Anglia and via social 
media. All participants signed an online informed consent form approved by the ethics 
committee of the school of Psychology. 
 
Perspective-taking task 
Selection of stimuli 
Stimuli were based on those used in Renoult et al. (2016); however, some items 
were altered from a Canadian to a UK version (e.g., Sears department store was changed to 
Marks and Spencer’s department store; see appendix for the list of stimuli). We selected the 
stimuli by asking 25 participants who did not participate in the experiment (13 females; 
mean age = 21.56, range = 19-25) how much they liked 20 stereotypically-young-person 
things (e.g., rollerblading, going to festivals) and 20 stereotypically-old-person things (e.g., 
birdwatching, gardening), now, and how much they would like these in the future at age 70. 
In each trial, the participants responded using a 7-point Likert scale: 1-strongly dislike, 2-
dislike, 3-dislike somewhat, 4-neutral, 5-like somewhat, 6-like, 7-strongly like. We then 
calculated the average difference in ratings between the now and future categories for each 
item and selected the 10 stereotypically-young-person and 10 stereotypically-old-person 
items that differed most in ratings according to time (now versus future). Paired-samples t-
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tests were used to confirm that all selected items differed significantly between “now” and 
“future” ratings (all ps < 0.01).  
Task design 
 The combined total of 20 stereotypically-young and old-person items provided the 
stimuli for the perspective taking task (see appendix). The same 7-point Likert scale as in the 
norming study was used (from 1-Strongly dislike to 7-Strongly like, see above). The 
questions were presented in the form of an online questionnaire created using the online 
survey software Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.com/). We asked participants how much 
they liked stereotypically-young-person things (e.g., rollerblading, going to festivals) versus 
stereotypically-old-person things (e.g., birdwatching, gardening) now, and how much they 
would like them when they are 70 years old. We also asked them to rate these items for a 
same-age peer, a close other (friend or romantic partner) and an older adult. For the close 
other condition, participants were asked whether they had been in a relationship for at least 
6 months. If yes, they were instructed to think about this person to complete the close 
other condition. If not, they had to think of someone they considered to be a close friend1. 
In trials in which participants were asked to take the perspective of a generic peer, the 
photograph of an unknown gender-matched face was presented as “Someone else your 
age”.  In trials in which participants were asked to take the perspective of an older adult, the 
photograph of an unknown gender-matched face was presented as “a 70-year-old”. In the 
close other condition, the name provided by the participant was presented. There were four 
perspectives (self, generic peer, close other, older adult), and 2 times (now versus future) 
that corresponded to seven separate blocks of trials: Self-Now, Self-Future, Generic Peer-
Now, Generic Peer-Future, Close other-Now, Close other-Future, Older adult-Now. The 
                                                
1
 30 participants thought about a close friend and 37 about a romantic partner. Results were similar for both 
categories, but are not broken down by category due to low statistical power.  
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blocks were presented randomly and each of the stereotypically-old and young items were 
also presented randomly within each of the blocks. Each participant answered a total of 140 
questions regarding preferences.  
 
Statistical analyses 
 To test the extent to which ratings of one’s own and peers’ preferences were 
similar/different, we conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA on preference ratings with the 
following factors: Time (now versus future), Item type (stereotypically-young versus 
stereotypically-old person things) and Perspective (self, generic peer, close other). In all 
cases, the dependent variable was preference scores.  
To test the extent to which predictions of self and peers’ preferences would differ 
from an older adult’s perspective, we conducted two additional repeated-measures 
ANOVAs. These ANOVAs included Perspective (self, generic peer, close other, older adult) 
and Item type (stereotypically-young versus stereotypically-old-person things) as within-
subject factors (time was not included because the older adult was only asked about in the 
now condition). One of these analyses was conducted with the Now conditions, and the 
other with the Future conditions of self and peers.  
Partial eta-squared (
 is indicated as a measure of effect size in all analyses. 
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Results 
Main Analysis 
 The repeated-measures ANOVA on preference ratings revealed main effects of 
perspective, F(2, 130) = 5.880, MSE = 0.535 , p = .005, ηp² = .083, and time F(1, 65) = 
180.374, MSE = 0.483 , p < .001, ηp² = .735. A three-way interaction between time, item 
type and perspective was also identified F(2, 130) = 29.421, MSE = 0.629, p < .001, ηp² = 
.312. We followed up these results with separate analyses of preference ratings by time 
period and by item type. 
 
Analysis by Time Period 
Now condition: Analysis for the now condition showed a main effect of perspective 
F(2, 130) = 4.402, MSE = 0.404, p = .019, ηp² = .063, and item type F(1, 65) = 155.225, MSE = 
1.515, p < .001, ηp² = .705, as well as an interaction between perspective and item type F(2, 
130) = 8.142, MSE = 0.77, p = .001, ηp² = .111. Pairwise comparisons for stereotypically-
young items revealed that participants attributed higher preference ratings to a generic 
peer (mean = 5.52) in comparison to themselves (mean = 5.04; p = .001), and in comparison 
to a close other (mean = 5.03; p = .001). No significant difference was found between the 
preference ratings for self and close other (p = .975). In contrast, for the stereotypically-old 
items, participants gave higher preference ratings to self (mean = 3.90) than to a generic 
peer (mean = 3.52; p = .001), or to a close other (mean = 3.55; p = .002). However, ratings 
for close other and generic peer did not significantly differ (p = 823).   
 This analysis about current preferences therefore suggests that participants rated 
generic peers as liking “young” items currently the most in comparison to the self and close 
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others. In contrast, participants judged that they, themselves, currently liked “old” items 
more than generic peers and close others (see Figure 1).  
 
Future condition: Analysis for the future condition again revealed a main effect of 
perspective F(2, 130) = 7.423, MSE = 0.356, p = .001, ηp² = .102, and item type F(1, 65) = 
159.533, MSE = 1.96, p < .001, ηp² = .711. An interaction between perspective and item type 
was also identified F(2, 130) = 10.724, MSE = 1.242, p < .001, ηp² = .142. Pairwise 
comparisons for stereotypically-young items revealed that participants allocated higher 
ratings to a close other (mean = 3.03) in comparison to a generic peer (mean = 2.67; p = 
.031). No significant difference was found when comparing close other and self (mean = 
2.90; p = .384), and the self and generic peer (p = .173). In contrast, for the stereotypically-
old items, participants attributed higher ratings to a generic peer (mean = 5.16) than the self 
(mean = 4.38; p < .001), and the close other (mean = 4.42; p < .001). No significant 
difference was found between the preference ratings of the close other and the self (p = 
.787). 
 This future preferences analysis therefore indicates that participants predicted they 
would like “young” items similarly to close others and generic peers. However, they judged 
that they and their close others would like “old” items less than generic peers would (see 
Figure 1).  
 
Analysis by Item Type 
Stereotypically-young items: Analysis of preference ratings for stereotypically-young 
items revealed a main effect of time F(1, 65) = 354.105, MSE = 1.509, p < .001, ηp² = .845, 
and an interaction between perspective and time F(2, 130) = 13.087, MSE = 0.502, p < .001, 
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ηp² = .168. Pairwise comparisons showed that, as expected, young items were preferred 
now relative to the future for both the self (means = 5.04 vs 2.90, respectively; p < .001), for 
a generic peer (means = 5.52 vs 2.67; p < .001), and a close other (means = 5.03 vs 3.03; p < 
.001). Importantly, however, the difference in ratings was greater for a generic peer (mean 
difference = 2.86) as compared to the self (mean difference = 2.13; p < .001), or a close 
other (mean difference = 2.00; p < .001). There was no significant difference between the 
ratings for the self and the close other (p = .422).  
 This analysis of change in preferences over time for “young” items revealed than 
participants predicted less change in preferences for self and close other than for a generic 
peer (see Figure 2).  
 
Stereotypically-old items: Analysis of preference ratings for stereotypically-old items 
revealed main effects of perspective F(2, 130) = 5.023, MSE = 0.767, p = .008, ηp² = .072, 
and time F(1, 65) = 87.680, MSE = 1.120, p < .001, ηp² = .574, as well as an interaction 
between perspective and time, F(2, 130) = 40.333, MSE = 0.307, p < .001, ηp² = .383. Again, 
as expected, pairwise comparisons highlighted that old items were rated as preferred in the 
future relative to now for the self (means = 4.38 vs 3.90, respectively; p < .001), for a generic 
peer (means = 5.16  vs 3.52; p < .001), and for a close other (means = 4.42 vs 3.55; p < .001). 
The difference in ratings with time was greatest for a generic peer (mean difference = 1.64) 
as compared to the self (mean difference = 0.48; p < .001), or as compared to a close other 
(mean difference = 0.9; p < .001). Moreover the difference in ratings was greater for a close 
other than for the self (p = .001).  
This analysis of change of preference over time for “old” items suggests that 
participants were predicting less change for themselves and their close others than for 
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generic peers. However, they also predicted less change for themselves than for their close 
others (see Figure 2).  
 
Comparison of younger and older adults’ perspectives 
Comparison between self, peers, and older adult “now”.  
 To test whether participants judged that they, their peers and their close others 
would have higher preference ratings for the young items and lower preference ratings for 
old items now than an older adult would, we ran a repeated-measures ANOVA comparing 
older adults, self, generic peers and close others in the ‘now’ condition. This analysis 
revealed a main effect of item type F(1, 65) = 12.452, MSE = 1.005, p = .001, ηp² = .159, and 
a main effect of perspective F(3, 195) = 46.97, MSE = 0.46, p < .001, ηp² = .416. An 
interaction between perspective and item type also emerged, F(3, 195) = 258.895, MSE = 
1.109, p < .001, ηp² = .78.  
 
Stereotypically-young items: For the stereotypically-young items, there was a main 
effect of perspective F(3, 195) = 257.577, MSE = 0.69, p < .001, ηp² = .796. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the participants gave lower preference ratings to an older adult 
(mean = 2.02) than the self (mean = 5.04; p < .001), close other (mean = 5.03; p < .001), and 
generic peer (mean = 5.52; p < .001). 
 
Stereotypically-old items: For the stereotypically-old items there was a main effect of 
perspective F(3, 195) = 89.273, MSE = 0.76, p < .001, ηp² = .575. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that, for these items, participants attributed higher preference ratings to an older 
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adult (mean = 5.42), than to a generic peer (mean = 3.52; p < .001), a close other (mean 
3.55; p < .001) and the self (mean = 3.90; p < .001). 
 As expected, these analyses indicated that participants judged that older adults 
currently liked “young” items less and “old” items more than themselves, close others and 
generic peers (see Figure 1).  
 
Comparison between older adult “now” and self and peers in the “future” 
 To determine whether the extent of the predicted change of preferences for the self, 
generic peer and close other in the ‘future’ condition would be comparable to those of an 
older adult ‘now’, we ran a repeated-measures ANOVA comparing older adults “now” with 
close other, generic peer and self in the future condition. This analysis revealed that there 
was a main effect of perspective F(3, 195) = 5.684, MSE = 0.362, p = .002, ηp² = .079, and a 
main effect of item type F(1, 65) = 296.004, MSE = 2.17, p < .001, ηp² = .818. An interaction 
between perspective and item type was also found, F(3, 195) = 32.78, MSE = 1.153, p < .001, 
ηp² = .332. 
 
Stereotypically-young items: For the stereotypically-young items there was a main effect of 
perspective F(3, 195) = 18.748, MSE = 0.823, p < .001, ηp² = .221. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that, for these items, participants gave the older adult (mean = 2.02) a lower 
preference rating in comparison to the self (mean = 2.91; p < .001), a close other (mean = 
3.03; p < .001), and a generic peer (mean = 2.67; p < .001). 
 
Stereotypically-old items: For the stereotypically-old items a main effect of 
perspective was found F(3, 195) = 36.132, MSE = 0.582, p <.001, ηp² = .354. Pairwise 
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comparisons revealed that, for these items, participants gave higher preference ratings to 
an older adult (mean = 5.42), than they did to a generic peer (mean = 5.16; p = .035), a close 
other (mean = 4.42; p < .001), and the self (mean = 4.38; p < .001). 
 Considering these results together shows that even though participants predicted 
that their preferences and those of generic peers and close others would change over time, 
they would still not change enough to be similar to the current preferences of an older 
adult.  
 
Control Analyses 
Item level analysis 
The difference in mean ratings for now versus future judgments might be similar 
between two conditions (e.g., self versus close other) and yet the amount of changes in 
preference might not be equivalent if some items are associated with increases in ratings 
while other items are associated with decreases. We thus computed an index of change 
based on responses given to the same items for now versus future judgments to verify that 
the presentism bias was homogeneous across individual items. For this, we subtracted 
preference scores for each item and each participant; for stereotypically-young items, we 
computed a “future minus now” score and for stereotypically-old items, a “now minus 
future” score. We then ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with the following within-subject 
factors: individual item (10 levels corresponding to 10 individual items, see appendix), item 
type (2 levels: stereotypically-young versus stereotypically-old items) and perspective (self, 
generic peer and close other). 
This analysis revealed main effects of individual item, F(9, 576) = 18.88, MSE = 3.928, 
p < .001, ηp² = .23, item type F(1, 64) = 174.16, MSE = 9.846, p < .001, ηp² = .73, and 
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perspective F(2, 128) = 28.73, MSE = 12.809, p < .001, ηp² = .31, as well as interactions 
between item type and perspective, F(2, 128) = 5.43, MSE = 4.364, p = .006, ηp² = .08, and 
item type and individual item, F(9, 576) = 6.81 MSE = 2.768, p < .001, ηp² = .096, but no 
interaction between item type, perspective and individual item, F(18, 1152) = 1.53, MSE = 
2.131, p = .102, ηp² = .02. 
Pairwise comparisons on the stereotypically-young items showed main effects of 
perspective, F(2, 132) = 14.03, MSE = 10.298, p < .001, ηp² = .17, and individual item, F(9, 
594) = 17.94, MSE = 3.303, p < .001, ηp² = .21, but no interaction between these factors, 
F(18, 1188) = 0.79, MSE = 2.213, p = .67, ηp² = .01. This indicated that the effect of 
perspective was homogeneous across individual items for the stereotypically-young items. 
For the stereotypically-old items, there were again main effects of perspective F(2, 
132) = 39.57, MSE = 6.192, p < .001, ηp² = .38, and individual item F(9, 594) = 9.87, MSE = 
3.463, p < .001, ηp² = .13, but also an interaction between these factors, F(18, 1188) = 2.81, 
MSE = 2.144, p = .001, ηp² = .04. Pairwise comparisons for each stereotypically-old item 
revealed that the effect of perspective was significant for all items (p < 0.02), except for the 
item cruise holidays for which the effect was only marginal (p = 0.09). Importantly, for all 
items, descriptive statistics indicated the same pattern of difference between current and 
future preferences: the magnitude of change in ratings was greater for peer followed by 
close other followed by self (peer > close other > self), as seen in the analyses using average 
preferences across items (see above). Therefore, even though one of the 10 stereotypically-
old items showed a less significant difference between current and future preferences, the 
effect of perspective was remarkably similar across individual items.  
 
Preferences of a control group of older adults 
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In the current experiment, we asked a group of young people to estimate their own 
current and future preferences (when they are 70) and the current preferences of a 70-year-
old. However, these predictions were based on what participants imagine an older adult to 
be like, rather than the actual reports of older adults. It is thus unclear whether the 
presentism bias that we observed reflects an inaccurate prediction of future change (i.e., 
participants thinking that they will not change enough to be similar to current older adults) 
or an inaccurate vision of what 70-year-olds like (e.g., participants underestimating the 
extent to which older adults may like young people items). 
We thus ran a complementary analysis with a group of 29 older adults (16 Females; 
mean age = 69.83, range 65-80). Using the same instructions as for our group of younger 
adults, we asked about their current preferences (Now condition), but also about their 
preferences when they were 20 years old (Past condition, mirroring our group of 20-year-
olds who were asked about when they are 70). For these analyses, we removed the item 
Instagram, which did not exist 50 years ago. We ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with the 
following within-subject factors: item type (2 levels: stereotypically-young versus 
stereotypically-old items) and time (now versus past).  
This analysis revealed an interaction between item type and time, F(1, 28) = 60.82, 
MSE = 0.285, p < .001, ηp² = .69. Pairwise comparisons revealed that older adults currently 
preferred stereotypically-old items (mean = 4.11) to stereotypically-young items (mean = 
2.77; p < .001). Analysis by time period showed higher ratings for stereotypically-young 
items at age 20 (mean = 3.82) than currently at age 70 (mean = 2.77; p < .001), and for 
stereotypically-old items at age 70 (mean = 4.11) than at age 20 (mean = 3.59; p < .001). 
 This control analysis indicated that our stereotypically-young and -old items 
appropriately reflected the current and past preferences of older adults (i.e., they currently 
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preferred “old” items to “young” items). Moreover, the actual preferences of older adults 
were similar to those estimated by our group of young adults for a generic older adult. Our 
young participants’ estimations were thus accurate, even though they reported that their 
own preferences would not change so much as to make them similar to those of older 
adults.   
 
 
Discussion 
Research consistently shows that we tend to mispredict our future preferences and 
values, and typically underestimate how much we will change - a phenomenon referred to 
as a “presentism bias” (Cameron et al., 2004; Gilbert et al., 2002). We recently found that 
this presentism bias is attenuated when we consider the future preferences of a same-sex 
peer (Renoult et al., 2016). The aim of the present study was to test whether the presentism 
bias also varies with social distance. Our participants performed a perspective-taking task in 
which they had to consider their own preferences, those of a generic peer and those of a 
close other now and in the future (i.e., when they are 70). Participants also had to estimate 
the current preferences of an older adult. We will briefly review our main results and then 
discuss these findings in the context of the literature on perspective-taking biases. 
Participants predicted less change between their own current and future 
preferences than between the current and future preferences of a generic peer, replicating 
the findings from Renoult et al. (2016). In addition, we found that participants predicted less 
change for a close other’s preferences than for those of a generic peer. These results 
suggest that similar presentism biases exist when we consider our own preferences and 
those of our close others. Consistent with this observation, when considering currently 
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relevant preferences (i.e., stereotypically-young items such as “rollerblading” and “going to 
festivals”), ratings for self and close others did not differ. However, even though preference 
ratings for a close other were generally found to be similar to those made for the self, they 
were not identical. When considering preferences relevant in the future (i.e., 
stereotypically-old items such as “birdwatching“ and “gardening”), participants predicted 
less change for themselves than for their close others, and less change for close others than 
for generic peers, showing a graded increase in predicted change between self, close others 
and generic peers. 
Consistent with Renoult et al. (2016) and previous studies (reviewed in Loewenstein 
et al., 2003), our participants did not have a strict “end of history illusion” (Quoidbach et al., 
2013). They estimated that they, their generic peers and close others currently preferred 
stereotypically-young items and would prefer stereotypically-old items in the future. 
Nonetheless, as compared to generic peers, they showed a robust presentism bias by 
estimating that their preferences would change less in the future. These findings replicate 
those of Renoult et al. (2016) with a UK sample of participants (rather than a Canadian one) 
and a modified item list.  
Interestingly, similar to our previous study, participants’ underestimation of change 
over time was not only produced by lower ratings of “old items” in the future. As compared 
to generic peers, participants also judged that they currently liked “old” items more, and 
“young” items less. These results are reminiscent of the “false uniqueness bias” (reviewed in 
Chambers, 2008). False uniqueness is the tendency to think we are better or less typical 
than average. The items most relevant to the present (i.e., the stereotypically-young ones) 
were rated as currently more preferred by a generic peer than the self. In contrast, those 
relevant in the future, the stereotypically-old items, were rated as more preferred by the 
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self now but more preferred by a generic peer in the future. This indicates that participants 
perceived themselves to be less typical than average for both types of items, and that false 
uniqueness biases are similar for judgements related to the present and the future (Kanten 
& Teigen, 2008; see also Renoult et al., 2016). 
Unlike the findings for generic peers, and in line with our hypotheses, preference 
ratings for self and close others were found to show many similarities. When considering 
currently-relevant preferences (i.e., stereotypically-young items), ratings for self and close 
others did not differ. As compared to themselves and their close others, participants 
estimated that the preferences of generic peers would change more over time. Thus, for 
currently-relevant preferences, presentism biases appear similar between self and close 
others. In contrast, when considering preferences relevant in the future (i.e., 
stereotypically-old items), participants predicted less change for themselves than for their 
close others, and less change for close others than for generic peers, showing a graded 
increase in predicted change (and a graded reduction in the presentism bias) between self, 
close other and generic peer. More specifically, differences between self and close others 
were due to higher current preference ratings for self than close others for stereotypically-
old items (ratings did not differ in the future condition). These results therefore suggest 
that, for preferences relevant in the future, presentism biases differ between self and close 
others.  
Taken together, our results show that, for currently-relevant preferences, 
presentism biases are non-distinguishable when considering our own preferences and those 
of our close others, but are reduced when thinking about generic peers. In contrast, for 
preferences relevant in the future, presentism biases are maximal when considering our 
own preferences, reduced when taking the perspective of our close others and further 
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reduced when thinking about generic peers. The “beneficial other effect” (Lee & Atance, 
2016), by which we typically make more adaptive choices when reasoning about others, 
may thus be even more prevalent for preferences relevant in the future. In contrast, for 
currently-relevant preferences, considering a close other’s perspective may not allow 
enough psychological distance to escape our presentism biases. Interestingly, even though 
presentism biases were minimal when considering the perspective of generic peers, 
participants estimated that these peers would still not change so much as to be similar to 
current older adults. More specifically, they estimated that older adults currently liked 
young items less and old items more than any of the young adult groups would in the 
future. Importantly, this finding is not likely to be due to our participants’ erroneous 
estimation of what older adults may like. Indeed, a control analysis with a group of older 
adults revealed that they currently liked old items more and young items less than they had 
at age 20. Presentism biases, while clearly attenuated when taking a generic peer 
perspective, may thus not be abolished.  
Another interpretation of these findings is the presence of a generation effect, by 
which young adults might anticipate that they will not necessarily like the same things in the 
future as current older adults do now.  However, a generational change in preferences 
would likely have resulted in a global decrease in future ratings for all items compared to 
current ratings for older adults. This is because as yet unknown “new” items would be 
preferred by the next generations. In contrast, our participants estimated that they and 
their peers would like stereotypically-young items more and stereotypically-old items less in 
the future, as compared to current older adults. Therefore, unless one speculates that a 
generation effect would only apply to one set of items, our findings are more easily 
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interpretable as an underestimation of change or, presentism bias (e.g., participants 
thinking that they will still like young items in the future), than as a generation effect. 
An important factor when considering social distance and comparing self, generic 
peers and close others is the qualitative gap that exists between self-relevant and non-self-
relevant stimuli. As pointed out by Sui & Humphreys (2015), a recurring question in research 
on the self is whether self-reference effects are influenced by other factors, such as 
enhanced familiarity of the stimulus, enhanced reward value, or increased emotional 
valence, as compared to non-self-relevant stimuli. Even though we believe, like these 
authors, that the specificity of self-representations cannot be completely reduced to these 
factors, they are nonetheless inherent to how we typicality operationalise the concept of 
self. Accordingly, we would have more knowledge about ourselves and our close others 
than about generic peers, and this knowledge should also have increased emotional 
valence. These factors could thus influence effects of social distance and comparisons 
between self, close others and generic peers.  
Why then would social distance (i.e., thinking about a generic peer rather than a 
close one) or difference in age (i.e., a young individual considering the perspective of an 
older adult) help us overcome presentism biases? One possibility is that the psychological 
distance imparted by considering someone else’s perspective allows us to more efficiently 
escape the here-and-now and the more emotional and visceral aspects of decision-making 
(Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Loewenstein, 1996; Naqvi et al., 2006). Accordingly, we may not 
always be in the best position to make decisions for a close other because we might be too 
“contaminated” by our own affective states (which could thus result in similar biases). 
Psychological distance results in thinking more abstractly (Liberman et al., 2007) and thus 
taking a generic peer perspective may reduce the presentism bias by relying more on 
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general semantic knowledge about the world and schemas (i.e., what people typically do), 
as compared to more difficult predictions based on personal knowledge or episodic memory 
(Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 2014). Moreover, because of this inherent difficulty in 
predicting how our values and preferences will change in the future, one may be misled to 
assume that such changes are unlikely (Quoidbach et al., 2013). This may explain why in the 
present study and in Renoult et al.’s study (2016), taking the current perspective of an older 
adult appears to result in the most accurate predictions, as neither preferences of 
participants nor those of their peers were thought to change enough in the future to be 
similar to those of older adults.  
Common misconceptions about future changes can have severe consequences, such 
as making poor health or financial choices in the present that our future selves will regret. 
Attempting to think differently about our future may thus have far- reaching impact. Based 
on the successes of some interventions to change future predictions (Sherman et al., 1985; 
Szpunar & Schacter, 2013), it is likely that reducing presentism biases is possible. Indeed, 
our results suggest that considering the current perspectives of generic peers or, even 
better, those of older adults, prior to making future simulations for oneself may lead to a 
more realistic estimation of the magnitude of likely changes in the future. 
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Appendix 
List of stimuli used in the perspective taking task  
Stereotypically-young -person things: 
1. Theme parks 
2. Rollerblading 
3. Converse shoes 
4. Living in a busy city 
5. White water rafting 
6. Going clubbing 
7. Going to festivals 
8. Rollercoasters 
9. Instagram 
10. Late nights 
 
Stereotypically-old-person things: 
1. Playing chess 
2. Dinner at 5 
3. Marks and Spencer's department store 
4. Volvo Cars 
5. Living in the peaceful countryside 
6. Birdwatching  
7. Gardening 
8. Cruise holidays 
9. Knitting 
10. Early nights 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Average preference ratings. Mean preference rating for the self, close other and 
generic peer both ‘now’ and in the ‘future’, as well as the mean current preferences of an 
older adult. Stereotypically-young items are represented in blue and stereotypically-old 
items in orange.  Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 2: Change in preference ratings with time. Mean difference in preference ratings for 
the self, close other, and generic peer. These differences were obtained by subtracting 
future from current preferences (for the stereotypically-young items, in blue) and current 
from future preferences (for the stereotypically-old items, in orange).  Error bars represent 
the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 1: Average preference ratings. Mean preference rating for the self, close other and generic peer both 
‘now’ and in the ‘future’, as well as the mean current preferences of an older adult. Stereotypically-young 
items are represented in blue and stereotypically-old items in orange.  Error bars represent the 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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Figure 2: Change in preference ratings with time. Mean difference in preference ratings for the self, close 
other, and generic peer. These differences were obtained by subtracting future from current preferences (for 
the stereotypically-young items, in blue) and current from future preferences (for the stereotypically-old 
items, in orange).  Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals.  
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